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Abstract. This paper contributes an in-depth understanding of privacy
concerns and perceptions of Arab users. We report on the first com-
parison of privacy perceptions among 1) users from high socioeconomic
groups in Arab countries (HSA), 2) users from medium to low socioeco-
nomic groups in Arab countries (LSA), and 3) as a baseline, users from
high socioeconomic groups in Germany (HSG). Our work is motivated
by the fact that most research in privacy focused on Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. This excludes
a segment of the population whose cultural norms and socioeconomic
status influence privacy perception and needs. We report on multiple
novel findings and unexpected similarities and differences across the user
groups. For example, shoulder surfing is more common across LSA and
HSG, and defamation is a major threat in LSA. We discuss the impli-
cations of our findings on the design of privacy protection measures for
investigated groups.
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1 Introduction
The ubiquity of technology around us has brought users a myriad of benefits.
On the downside, the ability to access private information almost anywhere and
at anytime comes with implications on user privacy. Acknowledging this issue, a
plethora of research investigated the privacy perceptions and concerns of users
[18, 21, 34, 35, 39, 54]. While these works significantly extended our understand-
ing of user privacy, it remains unclear if these findings generalize to the wider
populations of the world. In particular, there is a gap in the knowledge of privacy
perceptions and concerns of Arab users and the societies within the Arab world.
This problem is amplified by the fact that the vast majority of previous stud-
ies in this area were conducted with participants from Western, Industrialized,
Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies [36, 37]. The term WEIRD was coined
by Henrich et al. [37] in 2010, and since then researchers in behavioral psychol-
ogy have acknowledged that participants from WEIRD societies can often be
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psychological outliers [36, 37] because they represent less than 15% of the world
population. The Human-Computer Interaction community has recently acknowl-
edged this issue in HCI research too [60]. Furthermore, there has been a recent
increasing interest within the Usable Security and Privacy community to move
away from “one-size fits all” approach [66]. Since socioeconomic groups and cul-
tures are known to influence users’ perceptions of technology and its implications
[15, 42, 44], it is important to consider the potential impact of the socioeconomic
profile on the individual’s privacy perceptions. For example, would sharing of a
mobile device be perceived to out-weigh privacy concerns for low-income indi-
viduals? Do Arabs’ emphasis on reputation influence their protective measures
against privacy invasion? These reasons underline the necessity to expand our
understanding of privacy needs and concerns of different user groups, including
users from different cultures, as well as users from different socioeconomic groups.
To contribute in this direction, we focus on different socioeconomic groups within
the Arab world, and compare results to participants from WEIRD societies.
We chose the context of Arabs since their privacy needs and concerns are rel-
atively under-investigated in the literature. We expect to find novel concerns and
perceptions among this user group due to the unique cultures and values that
are shared among Arab countries. Preliminary investigations have already sug-
gested that there may be significant differences in privacy invasion experiences
between Arabs and non-Arabs [54]. To name a few relevant examples: Arabs
adhere to cultural values that could influence privacy perceptions. This, in turn,
could have an impact on the perceived implications of privacy violations. For
example, Arab women who wear a headscarf, aka Hijab, are likely to be more
careful in protecting their private pictures from men who are not part of the
woman’s family. They could, in turn, perceive the leak of private pictures to be
more dangerous compared to women in other societies. Another example is the
significance of dignity and reputation in the Arab world [59, 61]; an ill-reputation
caused by acts of defamation could influence an Arab’s relationships, as well as
social and economic opportunities. These differences encouraged the CHI, DIS
and CSCW communities to investigate needs and concerns of Arab users in the
respective fields [5, 8, 41, 51, 62].
In this work, we report on the first in-depth investigation of privacy concerns
and perceptions of users from high and medium to low socioeconomic groups in
two Arab countries. We refer to them hereafter as HSA and LSA for short. We
limited our pool of participants to those who are residing in said countries to
reduce the influence of external factors. As a baseline for comparison, we com-
pare results to participants from high socioeconomic groups in Germany (HSG).
In particular, we report on a survey (N=156) that was distributed among par-
ticipants who are from and reside in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. We
reached out for HSA and HSG participants through a questionnaire distributed
online, and LSA participants by distributing a printed Arabic translation of the
questionnaire to workers of a hospital. Among the findings, we found that con-
sequences of privacy invasion could be particularly severe for LSA users, and
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that shoulder surfing occurs more often among LSA and HSG participants. We
discuss the implications on designing privacy protection for said communities.
2 Related Work
In 1986, Shwartz discussed the phenomenon of withdrawal into privacy. He
showed how increasing the secrecy and boundaries between people causes more
intrigue and hence makes these boundaries more likely to be broken by others
[58]. However, with the widespread use of social networks, some argue that social
norms evolved and users are now comfortable sharing information openly with
others [67]. We investigate the current state of privacy concerns and perceptions
in low and high socioeconomic Arab groups.
2.1 Studying Privacy Perceptions
Privacy invasion has been studied in multiple situations. Types of privacy inva-
sion attacks that were investigated include identity theft, impersonation, spying,
profile harvesting, defamation, impersonation, credit card theft and shoulder
surfing [23, 40]. Shoulder surfing is defined as the act of observing other peoples
information without their consent [23].
Every society values and expresses privacy differently than others [65]. The
concept of the “average user” is now being abolished by many researchers. Egel-
man and Peer introduced psychographic targeting of privacy and security miti-
gations that relied on user profile understanding [22]. They found that decision
making styles were better predictors for privacy attitudes than the Big Five per-
sonality traits. Wisniewskia et al. also categorized users into six profiles depend-
ing on their sharing and privacy attitudes on Online Social Networks (OSNs)
and offered design implications for each user group [68]. Yoo et al. investigated
the effect of the hacking of a popular online Korean market on the privacy per-
ceptions of its users [70]. Findings show that mild previous experiences reduce
the perceptions of loss and that privacy concerns increase loss perceptions.
This suggests that privacy perception is influenced by one’s background.
Next, we discuss how cultural backgrounds influence privacy perceptions.
2.2 Cultures and Privacy Interplay
Sambasivan et al. emphasized the importance of understanding the role culture
plays in technology use and hence its influence on design [56].
Cultures also play a central role in shaping privacy concerns and perceptions.
Privacy researchers also noticed this gap and attempted to investigate influ-
ences of national culture on privacy perception. Dinev et al. compared privacy
perception about government surveillance in USA and Italy [18]. Results show
that Italian participants had lower privacy concerns. Habrach et al. conducted
a survey on eight countries concluding that Japanese and German participants
had higher privacy concerns on their smartphones than those from Australia,
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Canada, Italy, Netherlands, UK and USA. A survey on 325 Arab participants
showed that females are more concerned than males about their online privacy
and that Egyptians are more comfortable with privacy on social networks than
Emiratis [48]. Li et al. have predicted privacy based on the cultural dimensions of
an individual, emphasizing the importance of the difference culture makes in pri-
vacy decision making [44]. Harbach et al. compared risk perceptions across USA
and Germany [34]. They found that participants from USA were more concerned
about identity theft, while Germans were more concerned about hidden costs in
services, frauds and scams. Eiband et al. collected real shoulder surfing stories
from participants from different countries including Germany, Egypt, USA, Bul-
garia, India, Italy, Romania, Russia and South Korea [23]. However their aim
was not to compare cultures, bur rather to find evidence for shoulder surfing
in the real world; they did confirm that it is a real threat that indeed occurs
and has negative consequences on the user. Bellman et al. investigated how the
Hofstede cultural dimensions affect the perception and found that individualism,
masculinity and power distance all affected privacy attitude [13].
While national culture is a very important predictor of privacy perceptions
and attitudes, it is not sufficient. Wang et al. show the important role education
plays in privacy and how the participants with higher education have higher
privacy concerns [63]. Schwartz labels privacy as a luxury that not all users
can afford [58], and some users seem to agree [55]. Other researchers noticed
phenomena such as phone sharing and designed solutions that increase security
for these setups [53]. These works suggest that socioeconomic factors, such as
education and income, also influence privacy perceptions. There is a need to re-
visit the claim of privacy affordability due to the myriad of sensitive information
that is at risk of privacy invasion, and due to its potential serious consequences
particularly in underdeveloped and conservative cultures. Acknowledging this,
some researchers investigated ways of improving security for emergent users [38].
For example, previous work looked into increasing security in phone sharing sce-
narios among emergent users [53, 3]. Ahmed et al. studied privacy invasions by
local repair shops in Bangladesh [2]. They found that repairers often look at
private contents on customers’ phones. In another study, Ahmed et al. stud-
ied how government-imposed mandatory biometric registration for each mobile
phone results in concerns and suspicions within the Bangladeshi population [4].
Sambasivan et al. studied how women in south Asia navigate privacy within
complicated gender power balance [55].
These works underline the importance of understanding the influence of both
geographic and socioeconomic distributions on privacy perceptions.
3 Target Groups
Previous work in privacy and security reveals that there is a gap in understanding
the privacy concerns and perceptions of users from the Arab world. Furthermore,
there has been a steadily increasing adoption of technology among more users
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of low socioeconomic groups, This user group shows a set of under-investigated
design needs and concerns that are influenced by their unique privacy perception.
Preliminary work in this area has shown that there might be significant
differences in privacy invasion experiences in Arab communities compared to
non-Arab ones [54]. It has also been established that a person’s level of income
could influence their privacy concerns [58]. This led us to add two target groups
in our work: Users from High Socioeconomic groups in Arab countries (HSA),
and users from Low Socioeconomic groups in Arab countries (LSA). We chose to
study two Arab countries: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is the Arab country
in Africa with the most internet users (over 37 million users), Saudi Arabia the
Arab country in the Middle East with the most internet users (24 million out of
a 32 million population) [31]. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are Arab countries that
share many cultural dimensions due to common traditions and religion [30, 26].
Second, we chose users from High Socioeconomic groups in Germany (HSG)
as a baseline because (1) it is a typical Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich
and Democratic society, (2) this user group has been extensively studied in
previous work [23, 33–35]. We focused our work on women because previous
work has shown that women have more privacy concerns in the Arab world, so
we recruited more female participants [12, 1].
4 Questionnaire Development
The questionnaire4 was distributed online to high socioeconomic participants
(HSA and HSG) and offline for medium to low socioeconomic participants (LSA).
The questionnaire was developed in English and translated to Arabic for LSA
participants. Its translation was validated in terms of language and cultural
appropriateness by native speakers. A challenge in cultural studies in HCI is
ensuring that questions are tapping into the same constructs when the question-
naire is administered in different cultures [16]. Thus, to ensure cultural appro-
priateness, we conducted a pre-study where participants were asked to answer
the questionnaire then explain any difficulties or comments. Participants had
some issues with the questionnaire structure which we edited, but there were
no cultural issues reported. In addition, we are also familiar with the cultural
backgrounds of all our user groups by being integrated in their communities. We
used non-biased wordings and provided more space for participants to use their
own words through critical incident recall and open ended questions.
4.1 Questionnaire Design
National culture was determined by asking participants where they are from and
where they reside. Socioeconomic status was determined through anonymous
questions about the participant’s occupation, income, education, and residence
type, which are the most widely recognized measures for determining socioeco-
nomic statuses [28, 25]. The questionnaire was designed to collect very sensitive
4 Questionnaire can be found in the supplementary material section on Springer
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data, so the anonymity of the results and its separation from the demographic
data was emphasized throughout the questionnaire. This has been shown to
ensure high level of honesty when answering questions [45].
We used the critical incident technique [9]. Participants were asked to freely
recall a privacy violation incident using critical incidents that they have ex-
perienced or have witnessed. This facilitates the narration of the experiences
and makes the reflection on the questions more reliable as it relates to own life
events. To reduce social desirability bias, no negative connotations were used to
describe the attacker or the incidents [20]. Instead, the terms victim and attacker
were replaced by gender neutral personas. We used “Vic” and “Cas” in the En-
glish version, and “Nour” and “Ehsan” in the Arabic version. We conducted two
prestudies with 10 participants in which we iteratively improved the clarity of
the questionnaire and its organization by incorporating their feedback. All data
was anonymous and that the participants gave an informed consent that we can
store and use their anonymous responses for research non-commercial purposes.
Participants who filled the online questionnaire and wished to be considered for
the shopping voucher provided their emails; we separated emails before analysis
and discarded them after compensations were issued. No contact details were
collected from those who filled the printed version.
4.2 Questionnaire Structure
The questionnaire was divided into five sections:
Experience with Privacy Invasion The first section collected information
about participant’s experience with privacy invasion. Several types of privacy
invasions were listed and participants were asked to report if they experienced
them, and were asked to rank their perceived severity from 1 (Extremely Se-
vere) to 5 (Not Severe at all). Next, participants were asked to report a privacy
violation incident they experienced or observed in the form of an open question.
This was followed by questions on why participants perceived the situation to
involve privacy invasion, and the participant’s role in the incident, i.e., whether
the participant was Cas, Vic, or a third-party observer.
Details about the Incident In the second section, more information about the
privacy invasion incident was collected. We asked for the relationship between
the victim and the attacker, the consequences of the attack, the content that was
violated, the feelings of the participant towards the incident and the locations
and genders of those involved.
Relationships and Privacy Dynamics In the following section, participants
were asked to answer when and whom they believe can access their private infor-
mation without them considering it a privacy violation. Our aim from this ques-
tion was to understand if participants from the investigated user groups perceive
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privacy invasions by certain individuals to be acceptable. This was motivated by
preliminary indicators that some Arabs perceive the invasion of children privacy
to be justified [54].
Applied Preventative Measures After that, participants were asked to re-
port who they constantly try to protect their information from (e.g., colleagues,
family, etc.) and reasons behind that. This was done to investigate if relation-
ships play different roles depending on nationality and/or socioeconomic group.
Demographics and Socioeconomic Group Finally, participants were asked
to report their demographics to identify their socioeconomic status, including
their occupation, academic degree, residence and monthly income, as well as
their country of origin and residence [28, 25]. Inspired by prior work to exclude
invalid data [23], we asked participants to rate the honesty of their response on
a five-point Likert scale.
4.3 Distribution and Recruitment
In HSA and HSG, due to their educational background they were used to surveys
and hence it was easy to introduce ourselves and our survey objectives through
mailing lists and social media. For LSA, participants were at first hesitant. We
established rapport by visiting the community personally, talking to the par-
ticipants generally about social media and privacy, and showing them that we
are “on their side”. The questionnaire was distributed through social networks
and through Egyptian, Saudi and German university mailing lists. To include
more LSA participants who might not be reachable online, the questionnaire
was printed and administered to nurses in 3 hospitals in Egypt. The nurses’ ed-
ucational degrees were either Diplomas or university education with an average
salary of less than 3000 EGP per month. Based on their education, occupation
and income, they are considered from a medium to low socioeconomic group ac-
cording to prior work on socioeconomic status scale in Egypt [25]. Participants
were compensated with shopping vouchers or credit points for their studies.
4.4 Limitations
Self-report bias is a significant shortcoming of questionnaires [19], and ours it not
an exception; participants answer what they thought or believed the situation to
be, not what actually happened. We attempted to counteract this by providing
neutral connotations for attacker and victim to avoid strong positive or negative
associations that would increase the bias. Still, only 12% of participants reported
themselves as attackers or “Cas”, most likely due to the social desirability bias
[20]. Another issue is that to reach out for LSA participants, we administered
a paper-based version of the questionnaire. This may have led to bias as online
participants are self-selected, i.e., a participant might decide not to fill in the
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questionnaire if they do not want to. To balance this potential bias, offline ques-
tionnaires that included many empty response fields were excluded completely,
and the addition of the honesty question was considered where if participants
responded that they were not honest when answering the survey, their result
was also excluded. While there are limitations to questionnaires, this tool has
given us the ability to reach a wide variety of participants. In addition, using
the critical incident recall and allowing participants to use their own words and
ideas generated interesting results. We even got feedback from the participants
that the questionnaire was intriguing and fun.
5 Results
Table 1 shows a summary of the major results reported by the participants.
The survey was filled by 166 participants. We excluded 8 participants for not
answering the majority of questions. Furthermore, we excluded 2 participants
who responded “disagree” or “strongly disagree” when asked about the honesty
of their responses. Out of the remaining 156 participants, 58 participants were
males and 98 were females. The gender bias is due to the LSA group who were
mostly female nurses. Out of all participants, there were 39 LSA participants
from Egypt, 58 HSA participants (36 from Egypt and 22 from Saudi Arabia)
and 61 HSG participants from Germany. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to
57 with a mean age of 31 (SD=10.9).
Responses were coded by one researcher then revised by another to ensure
consistency and avoid bias. Open-ended questions were labeled and thematic
analysis, loosely based on the work of Guest et al. and Miles et al., was used to
extract the following themes [32, 46].
5.1 Theme 1: Experienced Types of Privacy Invasions
In the first section, we asked participants about the types of privacy invasions
they experienced. We provided a list of the following privacy invasion attacks,
and asked them to choose the ones they have experienced as an attacker, victim
or third-party observer. These included identity theft, impersonation, profile har-
vesting, spying, shoulder surfing, hacking, credit card theft, involuntary attacks.
These types of attacks were extracted from [17]; we then added shoulder surf-
ing [23] and credit card theft [40]. Figure 1 shows the type of privacy invasions
experienced by all groups.
Results show that while shoulder surfing is the most experienced form of at-
tacks, participants from the HSA do not report it as often. A possible reason is
that shoulder surfing occurs mostly in public transport [23] which is commonly
used by HSG and LSA, public transport is not commonly used by individu-
als who belong to high socioeconomic subgroups in the middle east (i.e., HSA
participants) [27].
Hacking, identity theft and defamation are generally common, and relatively
more common in the LSA group. This is fueled by acts of defamation as a form
of vengeance, and the importance of reputation in this culture [29, 52].
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Aspect LSA HSA HSG
Hacking
Black
Hat
Grey
Hat
Grey
Hat
Shoulder
Surfing
Frequent Infrequent Frequent
Perceived
Intentions
Malicious
and targeted
Random Random
Consequences
of Attack
Serious
consequences
Some
consequences
No
consequences
Acceptability
of privacy
invasion
situations
Not
accepted
Accepted in case
of parents
invading
child privacy
In case
of death
or individual
safety
Acceptability
of personal
information
access
from individuals
Sometimes
by spouses
Sometimes
by spouses
Not
accepted
Change of
privacy perception
after an attack
Yes Yes No
Most Commonly
invaded platforms
smartphones
(58.97%)
smartphones
(30.19%)
and laptops
(28.3%)
smartphones
(51.79%)
Table 1. Based on the results of a survey (N=156), we report on differences and
similarities between users from: Low Socioeconomic Arab societies (LSA), High So-
cioeconomic Arab Societies (HSA) and High Socioeconomic German Socities (HSG).
According to the Central Bank of Egypt, only 33% of Egyptian adults have
bank accounts [49]. Our results show that credit card theft is not experienced
often (6 out of 39) among LSA participants since individuals with low income in
Arab countries usually do not own credit cards or even bank accounts. On the
other hand, it is experienced more often among HSA participants (17 out of 58).
It is not often experienced often among HSG (6 out of 61). A possible reason is
that Germans tend to prefer cash transactions [11, 34].
Finally, device sharing attacks were only experienced in the LSA group (23
times). This is expected since phone sharing is more common in low socioeco-
nomic societies [69].
In addition to selecting the types of privacy invasions they experienced in the
last section, we further asked participants to report a particular privacy invasion
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Fig. 1. Number of attacks experienced across the 3 participant groups. The results show
that shoulder surfing is one of the most common privacy invasion types experienced
across all groups. However, HSG and LSA groups experience it more often than HSA.
Credit card theft is less common in HSG and LSA. Identity theft is most common in
LSA, while attacks related to device sharing are exclusive to LSAs.
incident that they recall in an open-ended question. We clarified that they can
report incidents in which they were attackers, victims, or third-party observers.
The following section describes the attack that participants deemed most rele-
vant to report then describe in detail. In addition to the privacy invasions types
reported in section 5.1, a new type of privacy invasion emerged from the data,
that we labeled “physical breach”. We use this term to refer to attacks where
the attacker gains access to the victim’s device by being physically present in
the same place, for example accessing their phone by borrowing it, participants
forgetting to logout and attackers using their accounts, or observing the victim’s
credentials and using them later. We also added a category: “application privacy
invasion” as participants complained that applications on their phones invaded
their privacy. Most of the LSA (34 out of 39) participants reported forms of
hacking as their privacy invasion incidents. This was not matched in HSA (17
out of 58) and HSG (18 out of 61) participants, whose leading form of invasions
were physical breach (61 out of 119) and shoulder surfing (45 out of 119).
In addition, LSA participants also reported more “black-hat hacking” cases,
i.e., incidents where the hacker has a malicious intent and causes personal dam-
age with actions such as identity theft and defamation. Over 50% (19 out of 34)
of the hacking incidents reported by LSA participants involved attackers spread-
ing private information about the victim, in particular personal photos. Personal
information was spread to the victim’s acquaintances, which often resulted in
severe damage to the victim’s relationships. One participant walked us through
how her relationship with her fiancee was affected after her Facebook profile was
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hacked. Over 70% (26 out of 34) of the hacking incidents reported were also
directed towards the victim specifically with an intent to personally hurt them
and were preempted rather than being random events. Around half (21 out of
34) of these attacks were by strangers, while the other half was by attackers
that the victim knew personally, such as colleagues, friends, or sometimes even
spouses. This can be due to the revengeful nature of this particular user group
[7], this will be discussed in further details in Section 5. In addition, most of the
hacking events included female victims (20 out of 37). Many of them included
male hackers to female victims (13 out of 37).
On the other hand, most of the attacks experienced by HSA (12 out of 17) and
HSG (10 out of 14) were “grey-hat hacking” where the hacker wanted to enjoy the
process of hacking and gaining access to the participants account over actually
harming them in their personal lives or relationships. Participants from both
HSA and HSG groups had their email or Facebook accounts hacked. According
to their responses, no real damage occurred with the exception of when hackers
requested money from the victim’s friends or from the victim himself to recover
the account.
5.2 Theme 2: Perceived Intentions of Attackers
Participants were asked about the perceived reasons for the privacy invasion and
the intentions of the attacker. In HSA and HSG, responses included coincidence
(5), curiosity (14), and boredom (5) which mostly showed mild negative connota-
tion or perception of the attacker. This is also inline with previous findings about
certain types of attacks such as shoulder surfing [23]. Some HSA and HSG par-
ticipants (24 out of 119) reported that the attacker sought money, which showed
negative connotation but was not directly related to this particular victim. Par-
ticipants stated that the attackers who stole the victim’s identity asked them or
their friends for in return for the account. On the other hand, participants from
LSA reported reasons such as revenge, defamation, immoral attacker and spying.
This shows that LSA individuals perceive attackers to have a higher negative
association than HSA and HSG victims. In addition, LSA individuals reported
that they believe these attacks to be directed at that particular victim and not
casual attacks that could have affected anyone. For example P129 mentioned
“my colleagues did this [attack] because they are jealous of me” and P142 men-
tioned “revenge” as a reason for the attack. This phenomenon can be explained
in two ways: it could be that the LSA participants are more anxious, suspicious
or mistrustful of attackers, or it could be that indeed acts of defamation and
revenge are more common within LSA societies.
5.3 Theme 3: Consequences and Reactions to the Attack
The reported consequences of the attacks varied according to the participants’
groups. HSA usually reported “no serious consequences”. For example, P08
stated “Cas knew private things about Vic, but there were no severe conse-
quences”. On a few occasions (5 out of 58), the consequences included reporting
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the incident to social network administrators, bank management or even to the
police. Around 70% (39 out of 58) of HSA participants also reported that the re-
lationships between the attacker and the victim were affected by the attack. For
example, P05 reported that Cas and Vic’s relationship after the attack featured
“uncomfortableness with Vic keeping more distance”.
On the other hand, HSG participants mostly reported “no consequences”
(48 out of 61) except in the case of shoulder surfing where they often changed
their behavior and became more careful about using their devices in public. For
example P70 said that the consequence of these attacks is “Rarely texting in
public places” and P85 highlighted “Extra awareness from other possible Cas
in the future” as a consequence. They also reported that the relationships were
mostly (40 out of 61) unaffected by the attack. For example, when asked about
how the relationship was affected P106 replied “not much, since Vic knows that
Cas will never stop doing those things, no matter how mad they make Vic”.
On the other hand, LSA (39 out of 39) reported the consequences to be
more serious and used terms like “loss of trust”(7), “ruined relationships” (12),
“defamation” (11) and even “divorce” (1). For example P132 reported that ”Vic
faced a lot of upsetting encounters from her friends because of the information
spread about them”. LSA participants (39 out of 39) reported that relationships
were strongly affected by attacks with more long term consequences than HSA.
These attacks also influenced the privacy perception of LSA participants
more than HSG and HSA participants. HSG participants’ majority (40 out of
61) were not influenced by the attacks and their privacy perception did not
change. For example, when asked if the situation affected their privacy percep-
tion P117 replied saying “No, because I am already cautious”. However, around
65% (37 out of 58) of HSA participants had their privacy perception changed
after the reported incidents while all LSA participants reported a change of
perception. Hacking and physical breach attacks caused the most influence on
privacy perception change over other types of attacks.
Finally, when reporting on whether or not the participants viewed the situa-
tion as resolved, all attacks involving spouses as the attackers (total of 8 attacks)
were perceived as not resolved across the three groups. HSA participants viewed
attacks by strangers as mostly resolved, while LSA participants had higher ex-
pectations before they can consider an incident to be resolved. For example,
they do not consider a situation in which “account access was regained” to be
resolved, since this does not undo the implications of the attack. This is likely
due to the perceived strong consequences of the attacks. Finally, HSG partic-
ipants showed no tendency in reporting whether or not attacks were resolved,
with almost 50% reporting resolved and 50% unresolved.
5.4 Theme 4: Acceptability of Privacy Invasion
Participants were asked about situations in which they believe privacy invasion
is acceptable, e.g., certain individuals whom they would allow to access personal
information without considering it a privacy invasion. HSG (22 out of 61) mostly
reported that they believe privacy invasion to be justified only in case the safety
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of an individual is at stake, or after a person’s death. For example P116 men-
tioned that if “[a] person gone missing, accessing private info might help finding
them; law enforcement” it would be acceptable to invade their privacy. On the
other hand, HSA were almost equally divided between the acceptance of privacy
invasion by parents (11 out of 58) to their children or not accepting privacy
invasion at all (13 out of 58). For example, P52 replied ”Parent checking on the
kids (viewing history of searches and views)”. LSA (37 out of 39) mostly did not
report any situation where privacy invasion was justified.
Results show that majority of participants (128 out of 156) from the three
user groups did not accept personal information access from anyone. Although
a few mentioned acceptability from friends, spouses and close family members,
the majority believed it to be unjustified. However, around 20% (19 out of 100)
of LSA and HSA accepted personal information access from spouses, opposed to
7% among HSG.
5.5 Theme 5: Privacy Invasion Platforms
Participants reported multiple platforms on which privacy invasion incidents
took place. Most prominently, privacy invasions occurred on desktop computers
(26), laptops (31), tablets (2) and smartphones (71). Most of the privacy inva-
sions in incidents reported by HSG and LSA participants involved smartphones:
51.8% (29 out of 56) of incidents reported by HSGs and 59% (23 out of 39) of
those reported by LSAs. On the other hand, HSA participants reported that
only 16 incidents out of 53 involved smartphones (30.2%). This difference can be
again attributed to the relative less use of public transport by HSA participants,
in which the majority of smartphone shoulder surfing takes place [23]. Another
possible reason is that LSA users are more likely to have smartphones opposed
to other more expensive devices such as tablets, desktops or laptop computers.
6 Discussion
This study investigated privacy invasion experiences and attitudes of 156 partic-
ipants in Germany, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Participants in Egypt are divided
to those with high socioeconomic status and medium-low socioeconomic status.
Findings show differences and similarities among the three groups in all areas
of investigation. Table 1 summarizes the results by comparing the differences
and similarities experienced across all three participant groups. The first obvi-
ous insight is that users from LSA, HSA and HSG have different privacy-related
experiences and perceptions, privacy concerns, and privacy requirements.
In this section we discuss the findings in light of prior work, and conclude
each subsection with implications for future work in this area.
6.1 LSAs need Usable Privacy Filters
Western cultures are relatively less conservative, and hence implications of pho-
tos leaks could be less severe. On the other hand, the Arab culture is governed
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by religion and traditions [6, 48]. Revealing personal information is very sensi-
tive and care must be taken to whom it is revealed to. For example, photos
especially of women tend to be kept private. Women who send their photos to
strangers are frowned upon and their reputation is highly affected. Hence, at-
tackers accessing someone’s social network accounts, and taking their photos
then claiming that the women have sent them or posting them publicly is very
dangerous to a woman’s reputation. Also, women who wear headscarfs might
exchange photos without their headscarfs with female friends online. If these
photos are leaked or retrieved maliciously by an attacker, the victim might be
subject to embarrassment, and harassment by friends and family [43, 29].
Implication: Future systems can auto detect private photos using computer
vision and machine learning (e.g., detecting the absence of headscarf or intimate
moments) and classify them as private ones.
The Arab culture is a collectivist one [29], certain information must be shared
with relatives and friends, otherwise the person will be perceived as hiding in-
formation, a sign of mistrust in the Arab world. This is the reason why sensitive
information might be shared in private messages in the first place.
Implication: This highlights the need for specialized systems that (1) can
support these sharing patterns with trusted individuals, while at the same time
(2) protect its users from unintended privacy leaks especially those that could
have negative implications due to the user’s culture, and (3) are usable to accom-
modate LSA users who could be less tech-savvy than other user groups. These
systems need to be accessible for low-literate users. One of the reported prob-
lems by LSA users is not knowing how data can be accessed and used against
them, or how their privacy can be violated. This prompts for solutions that raise
awareness of users. A simple solution that can be applied is providing periodic
pop-up notifications for privacy filters that users can apply. This can help users
understand the threat associated with this data and how it can be avoided.
6.2 Malicious Privacy Invasions are more Common in LSA Societies
One of the most popular concerns by participants is privacy invasion in online
social networks. Participants reported being hacked or leaking sensitive infor-
mation to attackers. These findings are consistent with previous work which
found that 7.1% of Arab respondents to a survey believed that “online social
networks might cause troubles” [48]. To combat these effects, Cutillo et al. cre-
ated Safebook [17]. Safebook is a social network that has an extra layer of safety
which stops the creation of fake accounts hence reducing the incidences of im-
personation. Safebook also does not allow revealing information about someone
by another person unless their consent is received. Another effort to increase
safety in social networks is Persona by Baden et al. [10]. Persona emphasizes the
role of user in their own privacy by displaying only the information that users
explicitly give consent to share.
Black Hat Hacking among LSA LSA experienced more “black hat hacking”
than HSA and HSG. This could be due to the fact that the lower socioeconomic
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groups hold more to the Arabic traditions than HSA which tends to be more
westernized due to exposure to Western education systems and frequent travel
[57]. Hence, the reveal of personal information can be very threatening to LSA.
Hackers are also more often acquaintances or even family members which shows
that these hacks are targeted with the malicious intent of defamation and harm
and often motivated by vengeance.
Implication: There should be more emphasis on the insider threat when
designing solutions for LSA users [50]. This begs the question of how to balance
protection against insider threats while allowing sharing to trusted individuals.
This topic requires further research. One potentially interesting direction is hav-
ing systems communicate to users the potential misuses of their information, or
giving users control over the content even when shared beyond the user’s first
contact (e.g., tell the user if their photo was forwarded, downloaded, or posted
somewhere on the web).
Shoulder Surfing is more common in LSA and HSG Results also show
that shoulder surfing is experienced more in LSA and HSG. This could be due
to the fact that the most common location for shoulder surfing is public trans-
portation [23] and individuals in HSA societies do not use public transportation
often, but rather use personal cars and taxis [27].
Implication: Since privacy invasions have serious consequences in LSA, our
results confirm the need for privacy protection mechanisms. Many works pro-
posed effective approaches for security and privacy protection yet they are not
employed in today’s every day technologies. For example, von Zezschwitz et
al. [72] proposed mechanisms to protect the visual privacy of photos from shoul-
der surfing while users browse images on their phones. Eiband et al. [24] proposed
protecting text content on mobile devices from shoulder surfing by displaying it
in the user’s handwriting, which is easy for the legitimate user to understand, but
difficult for observers to read. There are many works that protect illegitimate
access to social networks [10], and mobile devices (i.e. secure authentication)
[71]. Our results confirm that these additional measures for protecting privacy
are very important, since they can reduce the potentially severe threats that
certain user groups could be subject to.
6.3 Trust is Fragile among Arab Users
LSA viewed the attacks to have more serious consequences, this concurs with
the belief that defamation can cause serious damage to this user group [29]. It
also shows that preventative measures are very important to accommodate this
group. The common preventative technique used offline is trust recommenda-
tion. Offline, reputation is held through actions and word of mouth which is
maintained in a circle of acquaintances often within a neighbourhood or work-
place. This system can be implemented online by building trust recommendation
social networks. Other groups show less serious consequences due to the more
open minded nature of the relationships and the less malicious nature of the
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attacks. The Arab cultures are also more collectivist cultures, that is why they
tend to have a more trusting attitude [29]. However, the privacy attacks they
experience and the damage caused by these attacks can cause them to lose trust.
This loss of trust is conveyed by the change in privacy perception observed in
HSA and LSA after the attacks compared to HSG. Attacks from spouses are
never perceived as resolved. While attacks from strangers are viewed as resolved
in HSA and HSG because once the accounts are regained or the information is
dealt with, participants do not expect anything further due to the mild nature of
the consequences. On the other hand, LSA do not perceive issues to be resolved
since the consequences are very strong.
6.4 Exaggerated Fears
Participants from lower socioeconomic status in Arab countries are usually para-
noid about their own safety [47]. They believe that they are constantly being
monitored or attacked. This can be due to their limited resources and their fear
of not being secure enough, or due to the limited understanding of the secu-
rity features of technological devices. Therefore, they can easily believe that any
attack is directed to them even if it were a mere coincidence. LSA users often
think that others are participating in acts of defamation or revenge against them,
as suggested by P129 (LSA), who thought others are after her privacy due to
jealousy.
While lots of efforts are now directed towards customization for marginalized
groups. Some of the techniques and methodologies used may have hidden con-
sequences. For example, participatory design methods are used to tailor designs
such as the work done by Weber et al. [64]. However, care must be taken as
personalization can make users, and particularly LSA ones, worry or lose trust
of the system if it is perceived to be requesting more data than it needs [14].
This can also be counteracted by providing culture-appropriate awareness raising
techniques such as privacy filters mentioned above.
6.5 Privacy Invasion Acceptance
In terms of privacy invasion acceptance, participants from LSA did not accept
privacy invasion at all. This could be due to the strong consequences that the
previous privacy invasion encounters caused. On the other hand, many HSA par-
ticipants believed that parents can invade children privacy. This is deeply routed
in the Arab culture, where parents are perceived as having control and being
responsible over all nature of child safety and well-being. This is not reflected in
the HSG participants who see only personal safety, national threats and death
as acceptable reasons for privacy invasion. The implication of this phenomenon
on device access and access modes should be studied.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, we investigated the privacy invasion perceptions of 156 partici-
pants. A survey was conducted online and offline with participants from Ger-
many, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egyptian participants were divided between
high and medium-low socioeconomic groups. Participants were asked to report
privacy invasion incidents they experienced, their feelings and attitudes towards
them and how it changed their privacy perception. They were also asked about
their acceptability of privacy invasions in special circumstances or by special
people. Finally, they were asked about who they protect their privacy from. Par-
ticipants from LSA experienced more harmful attacks that resulted in stronger
consequences on their relationships and reputations. Participants from HSG were
more forgiving and experienced milder consequences. However, they showed a
change of attitude when it came to attacks of shoulder surfing. Participants from
HSA were in the middle of both extremes. They showed some concern about the
attacks they faced. In addition, HSA participants believed privacy invasion to
be accepted by parents to monitor children, while HSG sometimes believed it to
be acceptable in case of safety or death and LSA never believed it to be accept-
able. Designs must therefore be customized to each user group to assist them in
respecting their privacy and protecting their data.
These results underline that privacy-related experiences, perceptions, con-
cerns and requirements are different between LSA, HSA and HSG societies.
This implies that privacy protection mechanisms should be designed with dif-
ferences between different socioeconomic groups in mind, rather than following
a one-size-fits all approach with WEIRD societies in the forefront. Furthermore,
we confirm that privacy invasions are more common in LSA societies, and that
trust among Arab users is fragile. This emphasizes the importance of trust and
privacy protection when designing systems.
Our results highlight the need for usable privacy protection systems that are
tailored for each user group. For future work, we plan to study privacy in more
Arab cultures, and also investigate similar and different perceptions among the
studied groups and users from low socioeconomic groups in WEIRD countries.
References
1. Abokhodair, N., Vieweg, S.: Privacy & social media in the context of the arab gulf.
In: Proc. DIS’16. pp. 672–683. ACM (2016)
2. Ahmed, S.I., Guha, S., Rifat, M.R., Shezan, F.H., Dell, N.: Privacy in repair:
An analysis of the privacy challenges surrounding broken digital artifacts in
bangladesh. In: Proc. ICTD ’16. pp. 11:1–11:10. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2909609.2909661
3. Ahmed, S.I., Haque, M.R., Chen, J., Dell, N.: Digital privacy challenges with shared
mobile phone use in bangladesh. Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact. 1(CSCW),
17:1–17:20 (Dec 2017), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3134652
4. Ahmed, S.I., Haque, M.R., Guha, S., Rifat, M.R., Dell, N.: Privacy, security, and
surveillance in the global south: A study of biometric mobile sim registration in
18 M. Saleh et al.
bangladesh. In: Proc. CHI ’17. pp. 906–918. ACM (2017), http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/3025453.3025961
5. Al-Dawood, A., Abokhodair, N., El mimouni, H., Yarosh, S.: “against marrying a
stranger”: Marital matchmaking technologies in saudi arabia. In: Proc. DIS ’17.
pp. 1013–1024. ACM (2017), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3064663.3064683
6. Alabdulqader, E., Lazem, S., Khamis, M., Dray, S.: Exploring participatory design
methods to engage with arab communities. (2018), https://doi.org/10.1145/
3170427.3170623
7. Almaney, A.J., Alwan, A.: Communicating with the Arabs: A handbook for the
business executive. Waveland Press (1982)
8. Alsheikh, T., Rode, J.A., Lindley, S.E.: (whose) value-sensitive design: A study of
long- distance relationships in an arabic cultural context. In: Proc. CSCW ’11. pp.
75–84. ACM (2011), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1958824.1958836
9. Anderson, L., Wilson, S.: Critical incident technique. (1997)
10. Baden, R., Bender, A., Spring, N., Bhattacharjee, B., Starin, D.: Persona: an online
social network with user-defined privacy. In: ACM SIGCOMM Computer Commu-
nication Review. vol. 39, pp. 135–146. ACM (2009)
11. Bagnall, J., Bounie, D., Huynh, K.P., Kosse, A., Schmidt, T., Schuh, S.D., Stix,
H.: Consumer cash usage: A cross-country comparison with payment diary survey
data (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2796990
12. Belk, R., Sobh, R.: Gender and privacy in arab gulf states: Implications for con-
sumption and marketing. Handbook of Islamic marketing pp. 71–96 (2011)
13. Bellman, S., Johnson, E.J., Kobrin, S.J., Lohse, G.L.: International differences
in information privacy concerns: A global survey of consumers. The Information
Society 20(5), 313–324 (2004)
14. Briggs, P., Simpson, B., De Angeli, A.: Personalisation and trust: a reciprocal
relationship? In: Designing Personalized user experiences in eCommerce, pp. 39–
55. Springer (2004)
15. Ching, C.C., Basham, J.D., Jang, E.: The legacy of the digital divide: Gender,
socioeconomic status, and early exposure as predictors of full-spectrum technology
use among young adults. Urban Education 40(4), 394–411 (2005)
16. Clemmensen, T., Roese, K.: An overview of a decade of journal publications about
culture and human-computer interaction (hci). In: Katre, D., Orngreen, R., Yam-
miyavar, P., Clemmensen, T. (eds.) Human Work Interaction Design: Usability in
Social, Cultural and Organizational Contexts. pp. 98–112. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, Berlin, Heidelberg (2010)
17. Cutillo, L.A., Molva, R., Strufe, T.: Safebook: A privacy-preserving online so-
cial network leveraging on real-life trust. IEEE Communications Magazine 47(12)
(2009)
18. Dinev, T., Bellotto, M., Hart, P., Russo, V., Serra, I.: Internet users privacy con-
cerns and beliefs about government surveillance. Journal of Global Information
Management 14(4), 57–93 (2006). https://doi.org/10.4018/jgim.2006100103
19. Dunning, D., Heath, C., Suls, J.M.: Flawed self-assessment: Implications for health,
education, and the workplace. Psychological science in the public interest 5(3), 69–
106 (2004)
20. Edwards, A.L.: The social desirability variable in personality assessment and re-
search. (1957)
21. Egelman, S., Jain, S., Portnoff, R.S., Liao, K., Consolvo, S., Wagner, D.: Are you
ready to lock? In: Proc. CCS’14. pp. 750–761. ACM (2014), http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/2660267.2660273
What about my Privacy, Habibi? 19
22. Egelman, S., Peer, E.: The myth of the average user: Improving privacy and security
systems through individualization. In: Proc. NSPW ’15. pp. 16–28. ACM (2015),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2841113.2841115
23. Eiband, M., Khamis, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Hussmann, H., Alt, F.: Understanding
shoulder surfing in the wild: Stories from users and observers. In: Proc. CHI ’17.
pp. 4254–4265. ACM (2017), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3025453.3025636
24. Eiband, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Buschek, D., Hussmann, H.: My scrawl hides it
all: Protecting text messages against shoulder surfing with handwritten fonts. In:
Proc. CHI EA ’16. pp. 2041–2048. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
2851581.2892511
25. El-Gilany, A., El-Wehady, A., El-Wasify, M.: Updating and validation of the socioe-
conomic status scale for health research in egypt/mise a` jour et validation d’une
e´chelle du statut socioe´conomique pour la recherche en sante´ en e´gypte. Eastern
Mediterranean Health Journal 18(9), 962 (2012)
26. El-Gilany, A.H., Amr, M., Hammad, S.: Perceived stress among male medical stu-
dents in Egypt and Saudi Arabia: effect of sociodemographic factors. Ann Saudi
Med 28(6), 442–448 (2008)
27. Elias, W., Shiftan, Y.: The influence of individual’s risk perception and atti-
tudes on travel behavior. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice
46(8), 1241 – 1251 (2012), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0965856412000882
28. Fahmy, S.: Determining simple parameters for social classifications for health re-
search. Bull High Inst Public Health 13, 95–108 (1983)
29. Feghali, E.: Arab cultural communication patterns. International Journal of Inter-
cultural Relations 21(3), 345–378 (1997)
30. Finardi, U., Buratti, A.: Scientific collaboration framework of brics coun-
tries: an analysis of international coauthorship. Scientometrics 109(1), 433–
446 (Oct 2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-016-1927-0, https://doi.org/
10.1007/s11192-016-1927-0
31. Group, M.M.: Internet world stats. https://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats.htm, accessed 18 September 2018
32. Guest, G., MacQueen, K.M., Namey, E.E.: Applied thematic analysis. Sage Pub-
lications (2011)
33. Harbach, M., De Luca, A., Malkin, N., Egelman, S.: Keep on lockin’ in the free
world: A multi-national comparison of smartphone locking. In: Proc. CHI ’16. pp.
4823–4827. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2858036.2858273
34. Harbach, M., Fahl, S., Smith, M.: Who’s afraid of which bad wolf? a survey
of it security risk awareness. In: Proc. IEEE CSF’14. pp. 97–110 (July 2014).
https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2014.15
35. Harbach, M., von Zezschwitz, E., Fichtner, A., Luca, A.D., Smith, M.: It’s a hard
lock life: A field study of smartphone (un)locking behavior and risk perception.
In: Proc. SOUPS ’14. pp. 213–230. USENIX Association (2014), https://www.
usenix.org/conference/soups2014/proceedings/presentation/harbach
36. Henrich, J., Heine, S.J., Norenzayan, A.: Most people are not weird. Nature
466(7302), 29–29 (Jul 1 2010)
37. Henrich, J., Heine, S.J., Norenzayan, A.: The weirdest people in the world? Be-
havioral and Brain Sciences 33(2-3), 61–83 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/20550733
38. Jones, M., Robinson, S., Pearson, J., Joshi, M., Raju, D., Mbogo, C.C., Wangari, S.,
Joshi, A., Cutrell, E., Harper, R.: Beyond ”yesterday’s tomorrow”: Future-focused
20 M. Saleh et al.
mobile interaction design by and for emergent users. Personal Ubiquitous Comput.
21(1), 157–171 (Feb 2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-016-0982-0
39. Karlson, A.K., Brush, A., Schechter, S.: Can i borrow your phone?: understanding
concerns when sharing mobile phones. In: Proc. CHI’09. pp. 1647–1650. ACM
(2009)
40. Kelley, E.E., Motika, F., Motika, P.V., Motika, E.M.: Secure credit card (Nov 4
2003), uS Patent 6,641,050
41. Lazem, S., Jad, H.A.: We play we learn: Exploring the value of digital educational
games in rural egypt. In: Proc. CHI ’17. pp. 2782–2791. ACM (2017), http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/3025453.3025593
42. Lee, I., Choi, B., Kim, J., Hong, S.J.: Culture-technology fit: Effects of cultural
characteristics on the post-adoption beliefs of mobile internet users. International
Journal of Electronic Commerce 11(4), 11–51 (2007)
43. Levmore, S., Nussbaum, M.C.: The offensive internet. Harvard University Press
(2010)
44. Li, Y., Kobsa, A., Knijnenburg, B.P., Nguyen, M.C.: Cross-cultural privacy pre-
diction. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2017(2), 113–132 (2017)
45. Marques, D., Guerreiro, T., Carric¸o, L.: Measuring snooping behavior with surveys:
it’s how you ask it. In: Proc. CHI EA ’14. pp. 2479–2484. ACM (2014)
46. Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., Huberman, M.A., Huberman, M.: Qualitative data
analysis: An expanded sourcebook. sage (1994)
47. Mirowsky, J., Ross, C.E.: Paranoia and the structure of powerlessness. American
Sociological Review pp. 228–239 (1983)
48. Mohamed, A.A.A.: Online privacy concerns among social networks’ users/question
concernant les affaires personnelles des utilisateurs de re´seaux sociaux en ligne.
Cross-cultural communication 6(4), 74 (2010)
49. Mounir, H.: Only 33% of egyptian adults own bank accounts:
deputy cbe governor. https://dailynewsegypt.com/2017/10/24/
33-egyptian-adults-bank-accounts-deputy-cbe-governor/ (2017), accessed
18 September 2018
50. Muslukhov, I., Boshmaf, Y., Kuo, C., Lester, J., Beznosov, K.: Know your enemy:
The risk of unauthorized access in smartphones by insiders. In: Proc. MobileHCI
’13. pp. 271–280. ACM (2013), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2493190.2493223
51. Nassir, S., Leong, T.W.: Traversing boundaries: Understanding the experiences of
ageing saudis. In: Proc. CHI ’17. pp. 6386–6397. ACM (2017), http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/3025453.3025618
52. Nobles, A.Y., Sciarra, D.T.: Cultural determinants in the treatment of arab amer-
icans: A primer for mainstream therapists. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry
70(2), 182 (2000)
53. Robinson, S., Pearson, J., Reitmaier, T., Ahire, S., Jones, M.: Make yourself at
phone: Reimagining mobile interaction architectures with emergent users. In: Proc.
CHI ’18. pp. 407:1–407:12. ACM (2018), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3173574.
3173981
54. Saleh, M., Khamis, M., Sturm, C.: Privacy invasion experiences and perceptions:
A comparison between germany and the arab world. In: Proc. CHI EA ’18. ACM
(2018), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3170427.3188671
55. Sambasivan, N., Checkley, G., Batool, A., Ahmed, N., Nemer, D., Gayta´n-Lugo,
L.S., Matthews, T., Consolvo, S., Churchill, E.: “privacy is not for me, it’s for
those rich women”: Performative privacy practices on mobile phones by women
in south asia. In: Proc. SOUPS ’18. pp. 127–142. USENIX Association (2018),
https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2018/presentation/sambasivan
What about my Privacy, Habibi? 21
56. Sambasivan, N., Jain, N., Checkley, G., Baki, A., Herr, T.: A framework for
technology design for emerging markets. Interactions 24(3), 70–73 (Apr 2017),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3058496
57. Sayed, F.H.: Transforming education in Egypt: Western influence and domestic
policy reform. American Univ in Cairo Press (2006)
58. Schwartz, B.: The social psychology of privacy. American Journal of Sociology
73(6), 741–752 (1968)
59. Solove, D.J.: Speech, privacy, and reputation on the internet. Lovmore S., Nuss-
baum M.(2010), The offensive Internet (2010)
60. Sturm, C., Oh, A., Linxen, S., Abdelnour Nocera, J., Dray, S., Reinecke, K.:
How weird is hci?: Extending hci principles to other countries and cultures. In:
Proc. CHI EA ’15. pp. 2425–2428. ACM (2015), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
2702613.2702656
61. Sunstein, C.: Believing false rumors. The (2010)
62. Talhouk, R., Mesmar, S., Thieme, A., Balaam, M., Olivier, P., Akik, C., Ghattas,
H.: Syrian refugees and digital health in lebanon: Opportunities for improving
antenatal health. In: Proc. CHI ’16. pp. 331–342. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.
org/10.1145/2858036.2858331
63. Wang, P., Petrison, L.A.: Direct marketing activities and personal privacy: A con-
sumer survey. Journal of Direct Marketing 7(1), 7–19 (1993)
64. Weber, S., Harbach, M., Smith, M.: Participatory design for security-related user
interfaces. Proc. USEC 15 (2015)
65. Westin, A.F., Ruebhausen, O.M.: Privacy and freedom. Ig Publishing (2015)
66. Wilkinson, D., Namara, M., Badillo-Urquiola, K., Wisniewski, P., Knijnenburg,
B., Page, X., Toch, E., Romano-Bergstrom, J.: Moving beyond a “one-size fits all”
approach: Exploring individual differences in privacy (2018), https://doi.org/
10.1145/3170427.3170617
67. Wisniewski, P., Islam, A.N., Knijnenburg, B.P., Patil, S.: Give social network users
the privacy they want. In: Proc. CSCW ’15. pp. 1427–1441. ACM (2015), http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/2675133.2675256
68. Wisniewski, P.J., Knijnenburg, B.P., Lipford, H.R.: Making privacy personal: Pro-
filing social network users to inform privacy education and nudging. Interna-
tional Journal of Human-Computer Studies 98, 95 – 108 (2017), http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1071581916301185
69. Yardi, S., Bruckman, A.: Income, race, and class: Exploring socioeconomic differ-
ences in family technology use. In: Proc. CHI ’12. pp. 3041–3050. ACM (2012),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2207676.2208716
70. Yoo, C.W., Ahn, H.J., Rao, H.R.: An exploration of the impact of information
privacy invasion (2012)
71. von Zezschwitz, E., De Luca, A., Brunkow, B., Hussmann, H.: Swipin: Fast and
secure pin-entry on smartphones. In: Proc. CHI ’15. pp. 1403–1406. ACM (2015),
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2702123.2702212
72. von Zezschwitz, E., Ebbinghaus, S., Hussmann, H., De Luca, A.: You can’t watch
this!: Privacy-respectful photo browsing on smartphones. In: Proc. CHI ’16. pp.
4320–4324. ACM (2016), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2858036.2858120
